have hardly kept pace with the volume of treaty production or the diverse needs of clients. 4 The sources of treaty law in the United States are not easy to find or use, in part as a result of frequent shifts in publication practices of the government and the substantial time lag in making the texts of treaties available in practical form. 5 It is the purpose of this article to outline some of the salient features of the law of treaties that are most apt to concern a practitioner in handling on behalf of a private party some matter which is affected by a provision of a treaty or international agreement. It is not concerned with the substantive provisions of particular treaties;-nor is it concerned with those aspects of treaty law that are primarily, if not exclusively, of concern to the legal advisers in foreign offices and to the professors of international relations. 7 Of course, there remains a common ground of interest in treaty law that should concern both the private practitioner and the public international law expert.
I. ScopE oF TEY, TREATY PowER
In the United States the power to make treaties and other international agreements is lodged exclusively in the federal government; it is expressly forbidden to the states under the Constitution. 8 Since the very inception of the Constitution, and even before, 9 the power to make treaties has been regarded 4 Aside from general texts on international law, the latest reference work on treaty law in the United States is Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (1916) . In many respects the detailed comments on the Harvard Research draft convention, op. cit. supra note 3, are more useful than Crandall, but they also date back decades. In England the standard work on treaty law is McNair, The Law of Treaties-British Practice and Opinions (1938) . McNair later became Judge of the International Court of Justice. There is of course a vast periodical literature. 5 Consult Section VI infra. 6 For an analysis of treaty provisions on particular subjects, see: Boyd, Treaties Governing the Succession to Real Property by Aliens, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1001 Rev. (1953 7 For example, this article does not deal with such matters as the formalities of treaties or the capacity of various types of governments to enter into treaties. 8 Art. I, § 10. In Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1878), the Supreme Court used this clause in holding the Confederacy to be without legal existence. "The treaty-making power is not distributed; it is all vested in the national government; no part of it is vested in or reserved to the states.... [tihere is but one nation, acting in direct relation to and representation of every citizen in every state." Root, The Real Questions under the Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 Am. J. Int. L. 273,
(1907).
9 In Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199 (1796), the Supreme Court enforced the British treaty made with the Confederation in 1783, the provisions of which contemplated overturning a revolutionary statute of Virginia seizing Tory property. as a very broad power." 0 The exercise of the treaty power has varied with the international responsibilities of the United States." No treaty or executive agreement has yet been held to be unconstitutional, 2 but the court opinions have usually emphasized that the treaty power is not one unlimited by the Constitution." Varying terminology is employed in the Constitution referring to the documents through which the United States arrives at understandings with foreign countries for the conduct of relations with one another and their nationals. In Article II, Section 2, the President is given the power "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties." However, the limitations on state power in Article I, Section 10, use the additional words, "Alliance, or Constitution assured that those very treaty provisions would be enforced by the courts. This use of congressional-executive power should become the characteristic method of expression for American international policy. 19 The central thesis of McClure was the complete interchangeability of treaties and executive agreements: "The President can do by executive agreement anything that he can do by treaty, provided Congress by law coperates."
' s Admittedly quite controversial, 2 ' the interchangeability thesis probably lay at the basis of the movement for the Bricker Amendment. Exaggerations and misstatements have undoubtedly occurred on both sides of the controversy over executive agreements. The unwary can easily misconstrue the statements made on either side. To this writer only the combined executive-congressional agreement can be said to be truly interchangeable with a treaty, at least insofar as changing the domestic law of the United States is concerned." 2 The widespread interest displayed in the Bricker Amendment, and the support thereof by a large component of the organized bar, has already operated as a force of self-restraint upon the executive and upon the courts in passing upon the executive's assertion of the treaty power.
With particular reference to the trade agreements under the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934, Sayre wrote:
But the President in making executive agreements has no such free hand. He must act scrupulously within the laws and conform to the policies already established by the Congress. 23 It is a plain fact, as Professor Hyde has stated, that there are "instances where a Secretary of State has felt that for purposes of agreement the use of a treaty (1945) . They cited extended practice including the acquisition of territory, the settlement of international claims (usually by, rather than against, the United States), adherence to international organizations, trade agreements, international financial problems, and war debts. 2 The counterargument to the interchangeability thesis has been stated by Professor Borchard in Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 Yale L.J. 616 (1945), wherein Borchard listed ten particulars for distinguishing between a "treaty" and an "executive agreement." To the present writer it would appear that most of the alleged distinctions are without merit.
12 This statement is at variance with much of the specific language of United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) , and possibly with the actual holding of that case, although that is more debatable. It is believed that the Pink case set the high-water mark of the judicial doctrine on executive agreements and that the courts are now in retreat from that doctrine. Cf. judge Parker's opinion in the Capps case, op. cit. supra note 12.
2" The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 Col. L. Rev. 751, 755 (1939) .
[Vol. 23 was obligatory.
2 4 That appears to be particularly true for such subjects as taxation. 25 The two outstanding expositions of the effect of executive agreements upon domestic law arose out of the Litvinov agreement of November 16, 1933, under which the United States recognized the U.S.S.R. in return for pledges of ending communist propaganda in the United States and the "assignment" of Soviet rights to property within the United States 21 Note that the various tax arrangements for the relief of United States expenditures abroad from foreign taxes in the NATO countries (which the author helped to negotiate as the Treasury representative on the Rubin Mission) were entirely unilateral, i.e., they provided for relief for the United States from foreign taxes, and hence could properly be made in the form of executive agreements. Consult Efron and Hill, Foreign Taxes on United States Expenditures, 23 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 371 (1954) .
On the other hand, several of the earlier agreements for the avoidance of double taxation on income from shipping were in the form of executive agreements. Consult Appendix, The Pin case aroused great comment when it was decided, 2 and its reception has continued to be a critical one. Probably few would today quarrel with the actual holding as to the effect of the assignment of the rights of the nationalizing government to funds owned by the nationalized corporation within the United States in the absence of any conflicting claims to those funds by American creditors. The language used, however, to justify this result, which properly belongs to the law of international expropriations rather than the law of treaties, was far broader with respect to the efficacy of executive agreements than was necessary to the actual holding of the Supreme Court, which could be justified without reference to the effect of the executive agreement. This is of course not to argue that the executive act of extending "recognition" to a foreign government may not have important consequences in American law, but those consequences cannot properly be said to derive from the treaty-making power or the analogy thereto of the executive agreement. 3° The only judicial check, however, to the executive theory of executive agreements, as developed in the Belmont and Pink cases, is the opinion of Judge Parker in United States v. Capps,"' whether gratuitously expressed or otherwise, that an executive agreement cannot supplant the procedures provided by an act of Congress within its proper legislative field. The Supreme Court, however, declined to consider the merits of Judge Parker's views on the treaty aspects. 32 The effect of a treaty upon domestic law was one of the key diplomatic problems of the American Republic that led directly to the formulation of the treaty provision in Article VI of the Constitution." Under the Articles of Confederation there was the gravest doubt as to the binding effect of the peace treaties 29 Professor Borchard attacked the decision on the grounds that "[Tihe court has upset and parted with international law, as heretofore understood, gravely impaired or weakened the protection to private property afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, endowed a mere executive agreement by exchange of notes with the constitutional force of a formal treaty, misconstrued the agreement, and, it is respectfully submitted, confused that foreign policy of the United States in whose alleged support this revolutionary decision was thought necessary." 36 Am. J. Int. L. 275 (1942) . A more temperate comment was made by Professor Jessup in the same journal: "[Tihe effect of the Pink case may well prove to be salutary in the disposition of the mass of litigation which could have been anticipated as a result of the so-called nationalization decrees of the Dutch and Norwegian Governments, now in exile. The fact that this opinion has been handed down at the threshold of what might well have proved to be a flood of litigation may fend off many actions. In this respect, the situation is far better than that which confronted the courts when the maze of Russian cases descended upon them, beginning with the Wulfsohn and Cibrario cases in 1923." 36 Am. J. Ibid., at 236. The Court was not unmindful of the possible injustice to the debtor who might have to pay his debt twice and specifically alluded to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which was of course not applicable to the Virginia statute. "Although Virginia is not bound to make compensation to the debtors, yet it is evident that they ought to be indemnified, and it [is] not to be supposed, that those whose duty it may be to make the compensation, will permit the rights of our citizens to be sacrificed to a public object, without the fullest indemnity." Ibid., at 245. If the act of Congress, because it is the later law, must prescribe the rule by which this case is to be determined, we do not inquire whether it proceeds upon a just interpretation of the treaty, or an accurate knowledge of the facts of likeness or unlikeness of the articles, or whether it was an accidental or purposed departure from the treaty; and if the latter, whether the reasons for that departure are such as commend themselves to the just judgment of mankind....
To refuse to execute a treaty, for reasons which approve themselves to the conscientious judgment of the nation, is a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy; but the power to do so, is prerogative, of which no nation can be deprived, without deeply affecting its independence. 49 This doctrine was later approved by the Supreme Court in Whitney v. RobertSon
5
A treaty is regarded as "self-executing" if it may be enforced by the courts without further legislation by the Congress. In this respect the treaty practice 47 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), appears to be the only case in which a later treaty has operated to overrule an earlier act of Congress.
"In fact, however, there have been few (the writer is not certain that there have been any) instances in which a treaty inconsistent with a prior act of Congress has been given full force and effect as law in this country without the assent of Congress. There may indeed have been cases in which, by treaty, certain action has been taken without reference to existing Federal laws, as, for example, where by treaty certain populations have been collectively naturalized, but such treaty action has not operated to repeal or annul the existing law upon the subject. Furthermore, with specific reference to commercial arrangements with foreign powers, Congress has explicitly denied that a treaty can operate to modify the arrangements which it, by statute, has provided, and, in actual practice, has in every instance succeeded in maintaining this point. 60 124 U.S. 190 (1888). The Court said, "By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.... It follows, therefore, that when a law is clear in its provisions, its validity cannot be assailed before the courts for want of conformity to stipulations of a previous treaty not already executed. Considerations of that character belong to another department of the government. The duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will." Ibid., at 194 52 and most other countries, in which a treaty does not become legally enforceable, nor does it have any effect upon private rights, until it is aided by domestic legislation. 3 The test in the United States as to whether a given treaty is self-executing is the intention of the government in negotiating the treaty. The fact that this determination is not always simple is demonstrated by the United States-Spanish treaty of 1829 which was found by the Supreme Court, speaking through the same Chief Justice, John Marshall, to be non-self-executing in Foster v. Neilson 54 and to be self- 52 "But in the United Kingdom, whenever a treaty (other than treaties relating to belligerent action), or anything done in pursuance of it, is likely to come into question in a court of law, or require for its enforcement the assistance of a court of law, the questions at once will arise whether the provisions of the treaty accord with the existing law of the land and whether any action proposed to be taken by the Crown to execute the treaty is authorized by the existing law of the land. If the answer to either of these questions is in the negative, the Crown must induce Parliament to legislate so as to make the necessary change in the law or to equip the Crown with the necessary power to execute the treaty. If Parliament declines to do so, the Crown will not ratify the treaty; if by imprudence the Crown has already ratified the treaty, the United Kingdom is bound by it (for the Crown is internationally omnicompetent in the matter of treaties), and the Crown must do its best to extricate the country from an embarrassing situation. Even the fact that the treaty has been ratified and is internationally binding upon the United Kingdom, does not enable a British court to give effect to it municipally if it should conflict with the law of the land. Nevertheless, a duty to make reparation for any resulting breach of an international obligation would arise. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the Court.
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Somewhat different language was used by Justice Miller in the Head Money Cases to the same general effect: But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country.
5
Even when treaties deal with related subject matters, such as patents and trademarks, one treaty may be held to be non-self-executing, s while another is held to be self-executing. 59 The Warsaw Convention on aviation limiting the liability of air lines for accidents has been held to be self-executing. 
1852).
The question arose in connection with the Jay Treaty, which had been approved by the Senate, whether the House of Representatives was bound to vote the appropriation, with Hamilton and Madison taking opposite sides. The necessary funds were voted, but Madison secured the passage of a resolution affirming "the Constitutional right and duty of the House of Representatives... to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying" out the Department of State apparently took the position that a treaty reciprocally reducing tariff duties could not be self-executing in view of the special constitutional position of the House of Representatives over revenue,1 2 but with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act the question became academic. Similarly, the double tax treaties are regarded as self-executing, in part as a result of the specific language repeated in the annual revenue acts. 63 The "mostfavored-nation" clause, on the other hand, has not been treated by the Department of State as requiring congressional legislation. 6 4 Self-executing treaties may:
[A]dd territory to the United States, supersede conflicting state or federal statutes, create exemptions from jurisdiction, invest aliens with the privilege of entering the United States, or provide for the surrender of fugitives from justice.
5
After a highly controversial litigation in California, the Charter of the United Nations has been held to be non-self-executing insofar as the human rights provisions thereof are concerned. The litigation arose out of an attack on the Alien Land Law which forbade aliens, who were ineligible to become citizens, to acquire or use real property. The District Court of Appeals for the Second District held the California statute invalid as in conflict with the UN Charter. think, however, that the better view is that a treaty affecting patent rights [created by and dependent upon statutes which only Congress has power to enact] may be so drawn as to be self-executing." Ibid., at 500.
66 " A perusal of the Charter renders it manifest that restrictions contained in the Alien Land Law are in direct conflict with the plain terms of the Charter ... [referring to the Preamble and to articles 1, 2, and 551 and with the purposes announced therein by its framers.... Clearly such a discrimination against a people of one race is contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of the Charter which, as a treaty, is paramount to every law of every State in conflict with it. The Alien Land Law must therefore yield to the treaty as the superior authority." Sei The provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in promoting observance of fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification. Instead, they are framed as a promise of future action by the member nations. The operative date of a treaty is the date of ratification, unless the treaty provides otherwise. 9 Formerly it was the rule in the United States that the 71 "The ratification may be a form, but it is an essential form; for the instrument, in point of legal efficacy, is imperfect without it.... [T]he ratification is the point from which the treaty must take effect." The Eliza Ann, 1 Dod. 244, 248, 250 (High Court of Admiralty, 1813). 72 In the Iloilo Claim, the American agent before the British-American Claims Commission of 1910 argued, in reply to the British contention in favor of the retroactivity rule as announced by United States courts, that such opinions should be ignored in the light of the "well-known facts of international practice." The award of the commission sustained the American contention that retroactivity was contrary to international law. Nielsen's Report, American and British Claims Arbitration 382 (1926).
plied to treaties involving private rights, 7 and that understandably so in view of the customary "injunction to secrecy" over the handling of treaties prior to their approval by the Senate. Substantially all modern treaties contain express provisions on their effective date.
A reservation to a treaty usually takes the form of a declaration by a state, at the time of signing, ratifying, or acceding to a treaty, that it is willing to be a party to the treaty only on certain specified terms which will limit the treaty insofar as it is concerned. 7 4 When made at the time of signature 75 there is frequently an opportunity for the other states to adopt the reservation and thereby make it general with respect to the treaty. 76 Reservations made in the course of ratification, 7 7 i.e., by the Senate, present somewhat greater difficulties, especially in the case of multipartite treaties. Reservations by the Senate to bilateral treaties may at times be "rather easily adjusted" 7 by the two governments. In the case of multipartite treaties, however, it is necessary to bring the reservations to the knowledge of all the other contracting states to secure their approval. 7 9 If some states have already ratified the treaty, their acceptance of the reservations must somehow be secured. Hackworth admits that "failure to object to reservations" may on some authority be regarded as acceptance, but supports "the better view" that such failure should not be regarded as acceptance "in the absence of some act by the party which has already deposited its ratification indicating that it regards the treaty as operative between it and the party making the reservation.1 8 0 It is to avoid these difficulties that resort is sometimes had to "understandings short of reservations" of varying effect and significance, such as interpretative protocols, accompanying minutes, declarations, exchanges of notes, and legislative reports. 81 The principal importance of such understandings for the private practitioner is their possible use in proceedings before tribunals, particularly those of the government so stating its "understanding" of the treaty. Where the government of the forum did not participate in the formulation of the "understanding," it is likely that it will have little or no significance in a particular controversy.
Under Article 102 of the UN Charter "every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it." In the event of failure so to register, the Charter provides that no party to an unregistered treaty "may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations." 8 2 This requirement parallels that of Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 83 which was designed to abolish "secret diplomacy." 8 4 In the Pablo Najero case, Mexico, which was not at the time a member of the League of Nations, raised the question of the effect of the failure to register the French-Mexican Claims Convention of 1924. The Claims Commission, sitting in its own cause as it were, ruled that the failure to register the convention with the League Secretariat did not affect the validity of the convention as between parties, but would preclude them from invoking the treaty before any organ of the League or before an international tribunal.
5 A similar conclusion was in effect reached by the Permanent Court of International Justice."'
III. THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
The function of interpreting treaties is shared between the executive, who negotiated the treaty, and the courts, which enforce the treaty as "the supreme law of the land." On occasion the courts have deferred to the'executive on the ground that "the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department. 9 "Fundamental among those rules is the one laid down by Vattel: 'It is not permissible to interpret what has no need of interpretation.' Other rules more or less generally agreed upon include those to the effect that usually the words of a treaty should be interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their context; that technical terms should be given their technical meaning; that no word, phrase or clause in a treaty should be considered as being without meaning, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary; that a treaty should be considered as a whole and each of its parts in the light of all the others; that an interpretation which would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result, or one which would render a treaty inoperative, ineffective or nugatory should be avoided; that in cases of doubt, that interpretation should be adopted which involves the minimum of obligation for the parties and which is most favorable to the freedom and independence of States; that that interpretation of a provision is to be preferred which is least to the advantage of the party for whose benefit it was inserted in the treaty, or which is least onerous for the party making a concession." The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 940.
[Vol. 23 assumptions. 93 Hyde championed the view that the purpose of interpretation is to discover "the signification which the several parties to an agreement may be regarded as having attached to their words," by using whatever means and evidence seem most likely to serve that purpose. 9 4 Plainly the interpretation of treaties, like that of statutes, is not a mechanical task to be performed by the routine application of maxims, whether phrased in Latin or English. In many cases it will be found that not one but two or more maxims appear applicable, with contradictory results, which of course settles nothing of importance with respect to the text of the treaty, which may itself contain inconsistent provisions.
9 5 The criticism of canons and maxims tends to overstatements of its own, and usually the critic evolves some canons of his own, such as the principle of effectiveness, the importance of "legislative history," or some other factor.
The objective of treaty construction is normally to ascertain the intention of the contracting states. 9 " Where no common intention existed, either because issues were ignored by the parties, deliberately or otherwise, or because the intention was not common for all the parties, who continued to maintain their pretreaty views, there is not very much that the process of interpretation can supply under ordinary circumstances. What that situation requires is plainly a new meeting of the minds of the contracting parties. It is of course possible, if the interpreters are creatively daring, that the process of interpretation can accomplish such a further agreement.
Many opinions of the Supreme Court have contained language to the effect that treaties "should receive a liberal interpretation," 97 or treaties should be given "a liberal rather than a narrow interpretation," ' or that "where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be preferred." 99 The classic state- "A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose which it is intended to serve. The historical background of the treaty, travaux preparatoires, the circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in these circumstances sought to be effected, the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty, and the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is being made, are to be considered in connection with the general purpose which the treaty is intended to serve." Art. 19 The competing canon is that of restrictive interpretation, which has equally authoritative support in the cases. In Rocca v. Thompson the argument of "liberal construction" in favor of the consular power was urged on behalf of the Argentine consul, claiming priority under an 1853 treaty over the public administrator appointed under state law for the purpose of administration of a decedent's estate, but Mr. Justice Day replied for the Court: It is further to be observed that treaties are the subject of careful consideration before they are entered into, and are drawn by persons competent to express their meaning and to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes of the high contracting parties. Had it been the intention to commit the administration of estates of citizens of one country, dying in another, exclusively to the consul of the foreign nation, it would have been very easy to have declared that purpose in unmistakable terms.
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Substantially the same question was decided the same way under the United States-Swedish Convention of 1910 by Judge Cardozo, then of the New York Court of Appeals. After referring to past refusals of the United States to grant foreign consuls priority in the administration of estates, Cardozo said: It is not to be lightly presumed that the government of the nation departed from the precedents of a century, and by an obscure clause in a long and involved article of this convention overturned its settled practice. The World Court has enunciated a somewhat comparable "rule of effectiveness" in a series of cases. In the Chorzow Factory case it said: "[Alccount must be taken not only of the historical development of arbitration treaties, as well as of the terminology of such treaties, and of the grammatical and logical meaning of the words used, but also and more especially of the function which,in the intention of the contracting Parties, is to be attributed to this provision." Hambro, The Case Law of the International Court #50 (1952). In the Polish Nationality case it said: "If this were not the case, the value and sphere of application of the Treaty would be greatly diminished." Ibid., #6. But the World Court has also stressed the limitations on the "rule of effectiveness" in its opinion on the Peace Treaties: "The principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim: Ut res magis valeat quarn pereat, often referred to as the rule of effectiveness, cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions for the settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning which, as stated above, would be contrary to their letter and spirit." Ibid., #56. "International jurisprudence-and particularly that of the Permanent Court of International justice and its successor-has constantly acted upon the principle of effectiveness as the governing canon of interpretation. In fields falling peculiarly within the province of regulation by the states, as distinguished from the federal government, a number of decisions, particularly by state courts, have favored a restrictive interpretation of treaty provisions. These cases have related primarily-to hunting and fishing,"' 3 labor upon public works, wrongful death statutes, the operation of motor busses, etc.
1 4 There are obviously limits, however, upon the extent to which federalism can affect the interpretation of treaties. This was unequivocally pointed out by the Supreme Court in Nielsen v. Johnson, where in dealing with a discriminatory state inheritance tax under the treaty with Denmark it said:
[A]nd as the treaty-making power is independent of and superior to the legislative power of the states, the meaning of treaty provisions so construed is not restricted by any necessity of avoiding possible conflict with state legislation, and when so ascertained must prevail over inconsistent state enactments. Another duality in the interpretation of treaties is that between the reading of words in their natural meaning and their reading in the light of "legislative history." At first impression the "natural meaning" test is an obvious and just one, and that is the way in which it is frequently approached by the judicial authorities, particularly by the international tribunals which have a large proportion of non-United States members.
1 0° But in the absence of the background of "legislative history," how can one be certain that the words are plain and clear? The current answer of American courts to that question with respect to the Substantially all tribunals concur in the advisability of using "legislative history"-the somewhat stranger phrase "preparatory work" is more frequently encountered in the law of treaties-as a guide to the proper interpretation of a treaty. 10 Even the English judges, who customarily abhor the use of "legislative history" in the interpretation of acts of Parliament, have concurred in the use of "preparatory work" in the interpretation of treaties." n The term "preparatory work" has been defined by Lauterpacht, now the British judge on the International Court of Justice, as involving two meanings: (1) It may refer to the various written instruments emanating from or recording the declarations of the views of the negotiators of the treaty. Such preparatory work includes the diplomatic correspondence by means of which the treaty is negotiated when no special conference has been convened for the purpose. It includes, in other cases, the negotiations preceding the conference; the original and successive drafts of the treaty; negotiations at the conference and its committees as recorded in the minutes or otherwise; the instructions issued to delegates. There are other limits to the use of preparatory work in the interpretation of treaties, as where there is a real conflict between the "clear" meaning of the text of the treaty and the evidence of the preparatory work; 1 4 or where the preparatory work is in conflict with a long-continued judicial construction of language used in treaties which the "treaty-making agencies have not seen fit to alter."" 5 Multipartite "law-making" treaties may present a special problem for the use of preparatory work as an aid of interpretation, according to Professor Quincy Wright. In such cases the actual negotiation of the multipartite treaty is apt to be the work of only a few of the important parties; the remarks at the conference sessions are likely to be perfunctory; and the other acceding states "are usually officially cognizant only of the text and formal reservations and can not be supposed to have accepted interpretations suggested in the preliminary conversations of the original negotiators."" ' The distinction between contracts and statutes as drawn by Professor Wright has probably considerably less validity today than when he wrote. But the tendency to stress the limitations on the use of preparatory material in the construction of multipartite treaties has appeared to many as "intrinsically reasonable.""1 7 Actual immersion in the legislative and treaty-making processes from the standpoint of draftsmen has tended to make the instant author also rather sceptical of the utility of much that passes for "legislative history." He has been particularly concerned with the deliberate tendency to place items in the legislative history, where they may be glossed over without too much attention, whereas they probably would generate controversy if explicitly spelled out in the statute or treaty. "Conscious" making of "legislative history" is a real danger to beware of. Arbitral Tribunal which tribunal apparently thought that "some mistake" had crept into the preparatory work. While this case "stands almost by itself," it should be noted that in most cases where the World Court has made use of preparatory work it has been "but merely... to confirm the conclusions at which it had already arrived." The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 964. 
IV. Tim DURATION OF TREATIES
Treaties may come to an end in various ways."" The object of the treaty may have been accomplished, and there is no longer any necessity for the treaty. The treaty may have been made for a fixed period, following which it expires unless renewed by some positive act. The parties to the treaty may specifically agree to terminate a treaty by negotiating a new and different treaty covering substantially the same area or by agreeing to abrogate or dispense with the treaty entirely." 9 In most of these situations-except for the implied supersession of an older treaty by a newer treaty without express provision-there is not apt to arise any significant legal question of concern to the private practitioner. The treaty either exists or it does not exist, and that is presumably the end of it, save for the question of acquired rights. 12 The difficulties arise where there is a dispute whether a treaty remains in effect or not-whether an implied supersession has taken place by a newer treaty, 121 whether there has occurred some significant change in circumstances that renders performance under the treaty either impossible or specially onerous, whether there is an implied termination by notice. 12 2 The view of the executive on abrogation is ordinarily not challenged." The doctrine of rebus sic slantibus in its application to treaty law 128 is very national was not permitted to sue the Alien Property Custodian for the seizure of patents. This may be dictum, for the result could be justified under specific treaty provisions without raising the question of implied supersession. 12 "First, the principle lex posterior derogat priori is applicable to treaty law if the following five requirements are met:
(1) if the later treaty covers the same subject as the earlier treaty; (2) if the later treaty involves the same parties as the earlier treaty; (3) if the later treaty is of the sane level as or of a higher level than the earlier treaty; (4) if the scope of the later treaty is of the same degree of generality as the earlier treaty; (5) if the legal effect or effects provided for in the later treaty is or are different from that of the earlier treaty.
"Second, if these five requirements are met the earlier treaty is voidable to the extent that it is incompatible with the later treaty.
"Third, if one or more of the above five requirements are met only in part, the extent to which the earlier treaty is superseded by the later treaty is to be determined by way of interpretation. It may be controversial, in particular:
(1) whether and to what extent a later treaty concluded by two or more parties to a multilateral treaty without consent of all the original parties is valid; (2) whether and to what extent a treaty of the higher level prevails over a treaty of the lower level, e.g., the United Nations Charter over arrangements inter se of the members of the United Nations; (3) whether and to what extent a later treaty whose scope is less general than the original treaty (lex specialis) conflicts with an earlier treaty which is broader in scope; (4) whether, in case a treaty is declared voidable by the appropriate organ or organs of the community of nations or by appropriate domestic agencies on the ground that it is at variance with a later treaty, such a treaty becomes invalid ex nunc, i.e., from the time it has been dedared invalid; or whether it becomes invalid ex tune, i.e., from the date it entered into force." Aufricht, Supersession of Treaties in International Law, 37 Cornell L.Q. 655, 700 (1952) .
128 Generally see Hill, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Law (1934), and Bullington, International Treaties and the Clause "Rebus Sic Stantibus," 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 153 (1927) .
"Article 28. REBUS SIC STANTIBUS "(a) A treaty entered into with reference to the existence of a state of facts the continued existence of which was envisaged by the parties as a determining factor moving them to undertake the obligations stipulated, may be declared by a competent international tribunal or authority to have ceased to be binding, in the sense of calling for further performance, when that state of facts has been essentially changed.
"(b) Pending agreement by the parties upon and decision by a competent international tribunal or authority, the party which seeks such a declaration may provisionally suspend performance of its obligations under the treaty.
"(c) A provisional suspension of performance by the party seeking such a declaration will not be justified definitively until a decision to this effect has been rendered by the competent international tribunal or authority." The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1096.
The application of rebus sic stantibus to political treaties has been denounced as a pernicious doctrine by Professor Jessup. "In such situations it would amount to the proposition that no peace treaty accepted by a defeated state remains valid after that state recovers f9551] TREATY LAW controversial. This doctrine is essentially that a treaty may cease to be binding because of some change in the state of facts which existed or were envisaged by the parties at the time they entered into the treaty. The facts should normally be "essential" or "vital." That does not always appear to be required, but it is important that the consequences of the changes of fact should be substantial, i.e., resulting in injury or burden. Some of the disfavor in which the doctrine has been held was undoubtedly due to the arguments of Hitler for the unilateral revision of the "Versailles Dictate." But with the coming of World War II, the doctrine was given some respectability by being invoked by the governments of both the United Kingdom (together with the Commonwealth and France)' 2 9 and the United States. No international tribunal has so far recognized the doctrine as sufficiently excusing performance under a treaty. The World Court has on occasion approached the doctrine, only quickly to back away from it as a necessary part of sufficiently or the victors weaken sufficiently to make it politically possible for the defeated state to throw off the burden without danger of another defeat. No more unsettling legal principle could be imagined; but it would in fact, if accepted, reflect what has frequently occurred." Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations 150-51 (1948).
,9 The United Kingdom served notice that as a result of its declaration of war upon Germany it would no longer agree that its earlier acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court would be regarded as operative so far as events connected with World War II were concerned. 1"122 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887). The court said: "A treaty which on its face is of indefinite duration and which contains no clause providing for its termination may be annulled by one of the parties under certain circumstances. As between the nations it is in its nature a contract, and if the consideration fail, for example, or if its important provisions be broken by one party, the other may, at its option, declare it terminated.... Abrogation of a treaty may occur by change of circumstances [citing Wharton on rebus sic stantibus] .... The treaties had served their purpose; the conditions which they contemplated had changed. Whatever may have been the justice of French complaints of our course with Great Britain, and whatever may have been her rights under the circumstances, still she had so invaded the rights of the United States to free commerce in innocent cargoes upon the high seas, that a case was presented of such failure of consideration, and of such active infraction of the treaties, that this country was in a position to proclaim them ended." Ibid., at 416, 417, 425.
12 The Court of Claims pointed out that the Supreme Court had already decided as a matter of domestic law that the subsequent Act of Congress in 1798 had lawfully abrogated the French treaty of 1778 in Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. (U.S.) 259 (1817). its decision."' Nor has the related doctrine of "force majeure" been recognized.
3 4 The United Nations Charter does not contain any provision looking to the inapplicability of treaties as was found in the League Covenant." 5 Commercial treaties frequently provide for their termination or for the withdrawal of one party (in the case of a multipartite treaty) upon the giving of prescribed notice.
1 '" The exercise of a right of termination is occasionally necessitated by changes in the domestic law of one of the contracting parties; or it may be exercised to "cut some dead wood out of the treaty forest.
1 7 judge McNair, having regard for the "facility with which changes can now occur in the course of trade," has suggested that in the case of commercial treaties there ought to be a special rule entitling any party to an "implied right of denunciation upon giving reasonable notice." This right should be inferred "from the very nature of the treaty on the ground that it requires revision from time to time in order to bring it into harmony with changing conditions." 1 8 But neither McNair's government-the British-nor the United States authorities have accepted this view.
V. THE EFFECT OF WAR UPON PRIVATE RIGHTS UNDER TREATIES
The effect of the outbreak of war or hostilities upon existing treaties between or affecting the warring countries is a subject on which there is "a great con- 1'4 Turkey endeavored to rely on "force majeure"-not "duress" at the time of the treatyin its dispute before the Permanent Court of Arbitration with Russia over the payment of moratory interest on indemnities under the 1879 treaty. The Russian govermnent in its argument before the court conceded that a state could escape a treaty obligation "if the very existence of the State should be in danger." But the Hague court found that "it would clearly be exaggeration to admit that the payment (or obtaining of a loan for the repayment) of the comparatively small sum of about six million francs due the Russian claimants would imperil the existence of the Ottoman Empire or seriously compromise its internal or external situation. The exception of force inajeure can not, therefore, be admitted." Scott, Hague Court Reports 297, 318 (1916) .
In the Serbian Loans case, the government of Yugoslavia made a similar argument before the World Court to escape liability for pre-World War I loans, but the Court responded: "It cannot be maintained that the war itself, despite its grave economic consequences, affected the legal obligations of the contracts between the Serbian Government and the French bondholders. The economic dislocations caused by the war did not release the debtor State, although they may present equities which doubtless will receive appropriate consideration in the negotiations and-if resorted to-the arbitral determination for which Article II of the Special Agreement provides." Cited in 1 Schwarzenberger, International Law 184 (1945). trariety of views. The law of the subject is still in the making .... "1"9 The court on behalf of which these words were spoken added to the "great contrariety" in that very case. 140 The resulting uncertainty over the effect of war upon the status of treaties, generally or with regard to particular provisions, or as they may be applied in special cases, has naturally affected the enjoyment of private rights in connection with the ownership of property, the processes of inheritance, the conduct of litigation, and the operation of rights in patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
14 With the ending of hostilities and the coming of peace settlements, some of the uncertainty may be eliminated by specific provisions in the new treaties which may go far in determining what part, if any, of the old treaties should still be considered in effect. In the interval-which may be no short period in view of the complex political and other factors in negotiating a peace settlement with the defeated enemy-the best test for the guidance of Allen. 4 1 Under these cases it is not perhaps so much the outbreak of war as the treaty of peace that may give the final clue to whether a particular treaty is abrogated or not. 144 "War, in the first place, is no more than a circumstance which, in certain cases, justifies the denunciation of treaties. The determination of when such justification exists is a question of international law. War in itself possesses no inherent characteristic that requires an automatic and generally abrogative effect on treaties. Treaties remain in force unless they are denounced or are terminated pursuant to an express or implied provision in the treaty itself. Those treaties that provide that a party may denounce it if war breaks out indicate that it is The older view of international law was that war ipso facto abrogated all treaties between the warring enemies.
145 Abrogation is still the rule for treaties of political alliance for the obvious reason that the very basis of the alliance is destroyed by the outbreak of hostilities among the late allies. Abrogation is obviously not the rule for treaties which specifically envisaged the possibility of war and provided for its conduct and effect, e.g., the Hague and Geneva regulations.' One of the earliest of the United States treaties, that with Prussia in 1799, contained a specific provision on the property rights of merchants of either country residing in the other "if war should arise between the two contracting parties."
14 7 An extraordinary example among the great powers of nineteenthcentury Europe was the continued payments made by the United Kingdom on the Russo-Dutch Loan of 1815, even during the Crimean War, in accord with the express terms of the treaty that the servicing of the loan was not to be affected by war between the parties. 14 8 The determining factor is "the intent of the high contracting parties as expressed in the treaty,' ' 49 so far as it can be ascertained. 
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TREATY LAW tection against seizure during war (of 1812) as specifically provided under the Jay Treaty. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Washington said: There may be treaties of such a nature, as to their object and import, as that war will put an end to them; but where treaties contemplate a permanent arrangement of territorial, and other national rights, or which, in their terms are meant to provide for the event of an intervening war, it would be against every principle of just interpretation, to hold them extinguished by the event of war.... We think, therefore, that treaties stipulating for permanent rights, and general arrangements, and professing to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the case of war as well as of peace, do not cease on the occurrence of war, but are, at most, only suspended while it lasts; and unless they are waived by the parties, or new and repugnant stipulations are made, they revive in their operation at the return of peace.
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This trend away from the rule of complete abrogation has been characterized as: a necessary corollary of the increasing interdependence of States, the establishment of a vast network of treaty-relationships and a dearer appreciation of the general inconvenience of a practice which would result in the complete upsetting, under modem conditions, of those relationships."' Has this tendency been counterbalanced by the advent of "total war"?
A more articulate formulation of this view was given by Judge Cardozo, then a judge on the New York Court of Appeals, in the bench-mark case of Techi v. Hughes,"' in the form of the "compatibility" test for determining whether a given treaty, or some particular provision thereof, is to be regarded by the courts in a matter affecting private rights as in effect between countries engaged in hostilities with one another, in the absence of a declaration by the political arm of the government. The specific facts of the case made it a hard one to decide, for the claimant under the treaty was an American citizen who had lost her citizenship through marriage with an alien, but was an actual resident of the state of New York. The judicial result, however, was not a hard case making bad law, for the resulting opinion is one of the great American contributions to international law. The specific question was whether the Austrian Treaty of 1848, under which Austrian nationals were given the right to inherit land in the United States, had survived the outbreak of World War I between the United States and Austria-Hungary. In concluding that the treaty with Austria was still applicable to the inheritance of [Vol. 23
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are to presume that they have done... while war is still flagrant, and the will of the political departments of the government unrevealed, 1 5 6 the courts, as I view their function, play a humbler and more cautious part. It is not for them to denounce treaties generally, en bloc. Their part it is, as one provision or another is involved in some actual controversy before them, to determine whether, alone, or by force of connection with an inseparable scheme, the provision is inconsistent with the policy or safety of the nation in the emergency of war, and hence presumably intended to be limited to times of peace.... I find nothing incompatible with the policy of the government, with the safety of the nation, or with the maintenance of the war in the enforcement of this treaty so as to sustain the plaintiff's title. We do not confiscate the lands or goods of the stranger within our gates. If we permit him to remain, he is free during good behavior to buy property and sell it .... A public policy not outraged by purchase will not be outraged by inheritance.
15
The "compatibility" test was specifically adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Clark v. Allen 158 as the "correct" view, and was somewhat broadened. What is compared is no longer the state of hostilities so much as the national policy of the United States in relationship to the particular rights and duties under the particular treaty in the event of war. This case applied the treaty to the right of alien enemies to inherit and did not involve, as in Techt v. Hughes, the rights of a resident alien. A new factor was, of course, the Tradingwith-the-Enemy Act, under which the Alien Property Custodian had vested the estate inherited by the alien enemies. Mr. justice Douglas said for the Court: Where the relevant historical sources and the instrument itself give no plain indication that it is to become inoperative in whole or in part on the outbreak of war, we are left to determine, as Techt v. Hughes, supra, indicates, whether the provision under which rights are asserted is incompatible with national policy in time of war." 8 9 The Supreme Court decided that it was not.' The peace settlements of World Wars I and II contained specific provisions for the revival of bilateral treaties among the defeated enemy states and the allied powers through a procedure of notification. Within six months the individ- 19 331 U.S., at 513. 160 The distinction drawn by the Court between personal property and real property has been criticized. See note 115 supra.
VI. SOURCES FOR FINDING TREATY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
There is no single source for finding all the treaties and international agreements of the United States. Nor is it possible to determine the present status and significance of a given treaty from any authoritative single source. Nor is there any ready and reliable means of finding court decisions involving treaties and agreements. The publication of treaties and international agreements by the government of the United States has been characterized by fitful starts and stops, with a resulting series of discontinuities that must be the despair of any serious user. There has always been a substantial time lag between the ratification of a treaty and its publication in some source more accessible (and dignified) than a mimeographed press release of the Department of State. Parsimonious appropriations explain much of the difficulty, especially the discontinued series of publications. But the abandonment of the century-old practice of printing treaties and executive agreements among the Statutes at Large of the United States has certainly not simplified the task of the user of treaty law.
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Up until 1950, all treaties, and between 1931 and 1949 inclusive, all executive agreements with foreign governments, were published in the Statutes at Large. Since 1950, the official source of publication is a new publication entitled Treaties and Other International Agreements, whose physical appearance is admittedly more attractive although less impressive as "law," and considerably more cumbersome for citation purposes. That change in publication has played havoc with the various "statutes construed" tables of the digests, which have hitherto been a useful source for finding the case construction or citation of a given treaty, but this difficulty is probably temporary. For the last several years (since 1951) it has been idle to rely on the extremely useful publication of the Department of State entitled Treaty Developments, for its loose-leaf distribution this publication does not contain the text, English or foreign, but only a digest of treaties and international agreements. It contains references to the TIAS and "Stat." citations and such further information with respect to each agreement when appropriate, notes respecting date and place of signature, effective date, duration, citations to text, signatories, ratifications, adherences, accessions, reservations, amendments, extensions, terminations, authorizing and implementing legislation, Executive action, administrative interpretations, opinions of the Attorney General, court decisions, and other relevant action. 17 2 Unfortunately the use of this publication is limited to the loose-leaf pages issued between 1944 and 1952 (covering the year 1950), but the Department of State still has hopes of resuming publication in the future.
7. Indices to court decisions involving treaties . 
